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The legislature's exclusive poller to raise revenue. 
The legislature's exclusive poller to make laJJ. 
Idaho Code Section 20-212. 
The district court erred granting SUlTIIT1arY judgment in favor of 
IDOC on Searcy's Article II, Section 1 and Idaho Code 
Section 20-212 claims. 
1 • 
2. 
The Idaho Supreme Court held in Mead v. Arnell that 
administrative rules do not rise to the level of 
statutory laJJ, thus, II:XX::' s IDAPA Rules promulgated 
on November 2, 2012 are not an adequate "remedial action." 
In the alternative, if IDOC's IDAPA Rules are an 
adequate "remedial action," Searcy is still entitled 
to judgment and damages for the revenue raised 
prior to November 2, 2012. 
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I. STATEMENI' OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The case: This case is based upon Appellant Barry Searcy'_s 
("Searcy") Count I civil cause of action for declaratory judgment based upon 
Defendents 11 (hereinafter collectively identified as 11:rrxx::11 ) alleged illegal 
raising of revenue for IDOC uses through phone and cormnissary sales corrrnissions, 
medical co-pay fees and photocopying fees. Searcy appeals the district court's 
grant of summary judgment in favor of all Defendants as to Count I of the Civil 
Complaint. 
B. The Course Of The Proceedings. Searcy's Civil Complaint ,,as filed in 
the Fourth District Court on May 18, 2011 • (R, pp. 023-076). IIX:x::'. filed their 
Ans.ver to Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on July 18, 2011. (R, pp.088-
095). 
On October 20, 2011, Plaintiff filed his Partial Motion For Surnmary Judgment 
Against Defendant IDOC as to Liability Only on Count I, llith a supporting 
memorandum and affidavit, as to his Count I state declaratory judgment claim. 
(R, pp.104-180). 
On March 6, 2012, IDOC filed their Motion For Summary Judgment, llith a 
supporting Statement of Material Facts, memorandum (in support of their o.rm 
and in opposition to Searcy' s motion for summary judgment) and affidavits, .vhich 
1 The named Defendants are the IDAHO STATE BOA.RD OF CDRRECTION ( "ISBOC") , 
the IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CDRRECI'ION ("IDOC"), CAROLYN fl'.!ELINE ("Meline"), JIM 
TIBBS ("Tibbs"), JAY NIELSEN ("Nielsen"), ROBIN SANDY ("Sandy"), ANNA JANE 
DRESSEN ("Dressen"), BRENT REINKE ("Reinke") , PAM SONNEN ("Sonnen"), 'IDNY MEATI'E 
( "Meatte"), SUSAN FUJINAGA ( "Fuj inaga"), THED LOWE ( "LotJe"), and SHIRLEY AUDENS 
("Audens"), and are sued in their official capacities and as State employees. 
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sought summary judgment on all of Searcy's claims, including his claim for 
declarato:ry judgment. (R, pp.191-435). 
On March 26, 2012, Searcy responded to IDOC' s motion for summary judgment 
and replied to his o,m partial motion for summary judgment. (R, pp.478-495). 
His response / reply Nas supported by an affidavit. (R, pp.438-477). On 
March 30, 2012, IDOC replied to Searcy's response to their motion for summary 
judgment. (R, pp.496-506). A hearing Nas held on the parties' cross-motions 
for summary judgment on April 26, 2012. (R, p.510). 
On June 13, 2012, the district court entered a Memorandum Decision and 
Order Denying in Part Plaintiff's Partial Motion For Surnmary Judgment Against 
Defendant IDOC; Granting in Part Defendants' Motion For SUmmary Judgment; and 
Setting Schedule for Further Briefing. (R, pp.511-530). Therein, the district 
court found "that the funds collected from the telephone and commissa:ry 
commissions, deposited in the state treasu:ry, and appropriated back to IDOC 
are legislatively authorized pursuant to r.c. § 67-3611;" found "that the 
generation and collection of such funds is not a violation of Article II, 
Section 1 of the Idaho Constitution relating to the separation of poNers betNeen 
the three branches of government" and meets "the mandate of Idaho Constitution 
Article VII, Section 16 that "[t]he legislature shall pass all laNS necessa:ry 
to car:ry out the provisions of this article" and the mandate of Idaho 
Constitution Article X, Section 1 that penal institutions shall be "supported 
by the state in such manner as may be presecribed by laN. 1111 (R, p.515, L.24 
- p.516, L.14). 
HoNever, the district court requested further submissions from the parties 
on the folloNing topics: (1) the issue of legislative revieN of the specific 
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policies or procedures authorizing or requiring the collection of the hobby 
craft, medical co-pay and photocopy fees; (2) the issue of ,;,hether the State 
Board of Correction has the "exclusive" authority to institute user fees to 
off-set costs in light of the legislature's activity in that area; and (3) the 
process by Mch medical co-pay fees are accounted for ••• discussing 
specifically Alhether such process meets the constitutional requirement that 
the legislature provide such revenue as needful. (R, p.529, Ls.3-13). 
On August 6, 2012, IlXlC filed their Supplemental Memorandum in Support 
of Defendants' Motion for SUrnrnary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiff's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (hereinafter, "Defendants' Supplemental 
Memorandum") (R, pp.542-643). Defendants' Supplemental Memorandum ,;,as supported 
by affidavits (R, pp.564-643). 
On August 27, 2012, Searcy filed his Supplemental Memorandum in Support 
of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and in Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment (hereinafter, "Plaintiff's Supplemental 
Memorandum") (R, pp.646-661). On the same date, Searcy also filed his Motion 
To Reconsider The Court's Memorandum Decision And Order Filed June 13, 2012 
(hereinafter, "Plaintiff's Motion To Reconsider") and supporting memorandum. 
(R, pp.662-681 ). 
On September 24, 2012, the district court entered its Order Granting in 
Part Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (R, pp.688-690). 
On March 1, 2013, IlXlC responded to Plaintiff's Motion To Reconsider. 
(R, pp.699-711 ). On March 7, 2013, Searcy replied to ~·s response. (R, 
pp.712-720). Searcy's reply ,;,as supported by an affidavit. (R, pp.721-724). 
A hearing ,;,as held on the parties' supplemental briefing and Plaintiff's Motion 
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To Reconsider on March 8, 2013. (R, p.725). 
On May 16, 2013, the district court entered a Memorandum Decision and Order 
Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider; Denying Plaintiff's Motion For Partial 
Surmnary Judgment; and Granting in Part Defendants' Motion for Surmnary Judgment. 
(R, pp.726-738). Therein, the district court incorporated by reference its 
Jfuneil.3,, 2012 Memorandum Decision and Order. (R, p.729, Ls.9-+1) 
As to Searcy's Article II, Section 1 separation of :po,;rers claim (as applied 
to the hobby craft surcharge, medical co-pay and photocopy fees only), the 
district court noted that "the legislature has not explicitly provided for the 
specific fees at issue in this case via statute." (R, p.733, Ls.22-23). 
Ho,;rever, the district court found that "in the time since the filing of this 
Court's Memorandum Decision and Order on June 1 3, 201 2, IDAPA Rules have been 
promulgated setting the IIX>C fee structure, including the hobby craft surcharge, 
the photocopy fee, and the medical co-pay fee" and concluded that "[b]ecause 
the Defendants have taken remedial action to promulgate IDAPA rules subject 
to legislative oversight, the oourt finds no.'1T that the hobby craft surcharge, 
the photocopy fee, and the medical co-pay fee are not a violation of the 
separation of :po11Ters bet,;reen the executive and legislative branches of state 
government pursuant to Idaho Constitution Article II, Section 1. In addition, 
the Court finds that any claim made by the Plaintiff that the fees in question 
should have been promulgated as rules pursuant to I.C. § 20-212, is moot." 
(R, pp.734, Ls.15-17 and 21-24 - pp.735, Ls.2). 
As to Searcy' s Article X, Section 1 and Article VII, Sections 2 and 16 claims 
(as applied to the medical co-pay and photocopy fees only), the district court 
noted that Article X, Section 1 provides in pertinent part that " ••• penal 
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institutions • • • shall be established and supported by the state in such manner 
as may be prescribed by latJ;" that Article VII, Section 2 provides in pertinent 
part that "[t]he legislature shall provide such revenue as may be needful;" 
and that Article VII, Section 16 provides that "[t]he legislature shall pass 
all latJs necessary to carry out the provisions of this article." (R, p.735, 
Ls.4-20). 
HotJever, the district court found that "the medical co-pay and photocopy 
fees still at issue in this case are user fees and are not taxes. Accordingly, 
Plaintiff's claims pursuant to Idaho Constitution, Article VII, §§ 2 and 16 
must be dismissed." (R, p.736, Ls.10-12). The district court further found 
that "the Defendants have broad authority to set the State's policy regarding 
the control, direction and management of the penitentiaries of the state pursuant 
to Idaho Constitution, Article X, § 5, and they have taken appropriate remedial 
action to adopt IDAPA Rules concerning the department's fee structure tJith 
legislative oversight as required by I.C. § 20-212" and that "in light of the 
remedial action taken by the adoption of appropriate IDAPA Rules, the Defendants 
have not exceeded the authority granted to them in the Idaho Constitution, nor 
have they exceeded the authority granted to them by the legislature pursuant 
to I.C. § 20-212." (R, p.736, Ls.15-23). 
On June 4, 2013, the district court entered its Order Denying Plaintiff's 
Motion to Reconsider; Denying Plaintiff's Motion For Partial SUrnmary Judgment; 
and Granting Defendants' Motion for SUrnmary Judgment (R, pp.750-752) and Judgment 
(R, pp.753-755). 
Searcy timely filed his Notice of Appeal on July 15, 2013. (R, pp.766-
772; see also Amended Notice of Appeal at R, pp.797-801 ). 
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C. Statement Of The Facts. Plaintiff Barry Searcy is an inmate at the 
Idaho State Correctional Institution in Bouse, Idaho. On May 18, 2011, Searcy 
filed the Civil Complaint in this case, naming as defendants the Idaho State 
Board of Correction ("ISBOC") and the Idaho Department of Correction, along 
tJith individual defendants carolyn Meline, Jim Tibbs, Jay Nielsen, Robin Sandy, 
Anna Jane Dressen, Brent Reinke, Pam Sonnen, Tony Meatte, SUsan Fujinaga, Theo 
LotJe and Shirley Audens in their official capacities and as State employees. 
(R, p.512, Ls.1-6). Core allegations .vhich lie at the heart of Searcy's case 
are alleged at Paragraphs 34-36 of the Complaint: 
34. During the relevant times, in a scheme to circumvent the 
constitutional and statutory constraints on the legitimate means of securing 
revenue for IDOC uses, the Defendants executed, implemented, maintained 
and/or enforced IDOC policies, rules, practices and contracts as a means 
to take and obtain moneys belonging to Plaintiff Searcy and thousands of 
other persons totaling in the millions of dollars. 
35. Defendants' scheme illegally diverted moneys belonging to 
Plaintiff Searcy and thousands of other persons for IlXlC uses, tJithout 
express constitutional or statutory authority to do so, through phone and 
commissary sales commissions, medical co-pay fees, photocopy fees and hobby 
craft surcharges. 
36. Defendants' scheme also illegally diverted moneys belonging to 
the thousands of family, friends and associates of IlXlC inmates .vho provide 
support for said inmates, for IDOC uses, ~ithout express constitutional 
or statutory authority to do so, through direct phone time and corrrnissary 
purchases. 
(R, p.030). 
Pursuant to the subsequent findings of the district court, it is undisputed 
that IDOC charges the follotJing fees, commissions and co-pays to inmates .vho 
use the applicable programs or services: (1) sales commissions from telephone 
time purchases made by IDOC inmates and/or their family, friends and associates; 
(2) corrmissary sales commissions; (3) medical co-pay fees; and (4) photocopying 
fees. Further, it is undisputed that the Idaho legislature has not enacted 
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any statute specifically authorizing :O:X:C to impose the fees, commissions and 
co-pays (collectively referred to as "fees") .vhich are the subject of the 
Plaintiff's claims. Each of the fees imposed by Irxx: al'."e the subject of IlXlC 
policies or procedures and operate generally as folloNs: 
> IlXlC collects commissions on sales of telephone time and commissary 
goods and deposits such commissions into the Inmate Management Fund 
("IMF") for deposit into the state treasury pursuant to :O:X:C Standard 
Operating Procedure ("SOP") 114.03.03.014. The legislature then 
appropriates IMF funds back to :O:X:C each year as part of the budget 
process. 
> Pursuant to :O:X:C SOP 405.02.01.001 (Access to Courts), inmates are 
charges a fee of ten cents ( $. 1 0) per page for photocopies. Indigent 
inmates are not charged the fee for photocopying and all photocopying 
may be subject to page limits in accordance Mith court rules. 
> IlXlC Policy 411 provides that "[i]t is the policy of the Idaho Board 
of Correction that the Idaho Department of Correction (:O:X:C) and its 
contractors charge offenders incarcerated at IlXlC facilities a co-
pay for medical and pharmacy services, but do not deny access to 
medical, dental, and mental health services .vb.en the offender does 
not have the resources to pay for such services." IDOC SOP 
411.06.03.01 (Medical Co-Pay) provides that an offender-initiated 
medical visit is assessed a five dollar ($5.00) medical co-pay fee. 
ewe Nork release offenders are assessed a ten dollar ($10.00) medical 
co-pay fee. A three dollar ($3.00) pharmacy service medical co-pay 
fee is assessed for dispensing either over-the-counter or prescription 
medications per course/treatment or per prescription. Employed ewe 
Nork release offenders are assessed a five dollar ($5.00) pharmacy 
co-pay fee. Medical co-pay funds are used by :O:X:C to offset general 
fund medical expenses. 
(R, pp.512, Ls.7 - pp.513, Ls.4). 
Count I of the Civil Complaint is entitled "Violation of Idaho Code Section 
20-212; Idaho Constitution, Article II,§ 1; Article VII,§§ 2, 5 and 16; 
Article X, § 1; and Idaho Code§ 18-314; Under Idaho Code§§ 10-1201 et seq." 
(R, p.041; p.513, Ls.11-14). In Count I, Searcy presented the folloNing 
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declaratory judgment question (R, p.041, at Paragraph 94) to be ansA7ered by 
2 the Court: 
94. The question to be detennined here is this: Does the raising 
of revenue for IIXlC uses by Defendants, the Board, the IIX)C, Meline, Tibbs, 
Neilsen, Sandy, Dressen, Reinke, Sonnen, Meatte, Fujinaga, LoA7e and Audens, 
through phone and commissary commissions, medical co-pay fees, photocopying 
fees and hobby craft surcharges, exceed and violate the scope of rule making 
authority granted under Idaho Code Section 20-212; and/or violate the 
provisions of Idaho Constitution, Article II, Section 1; Article VII, 
Sections 2, 5 and/or 16; Article X, Section 1; and/or Idaho Code Section 
18-314? 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
ISSUE I. 
Did the district court err in concluding that the revenue raised by IIX)C 
through medical co-pays and photocopy fees does not violate Article II, Section 1 
of the Idaho Constitution and/or Idaho Code Section 20-212 by ruling that IDAP~ 
Rules promulgated by IIXlC on November 2, 2012 A7ere a "remedial action?" 
ISSUE II. 
Did the district court err in concluding that the revenue raised by IIXlC 
through medical co-pays and photocopy fees does not violate Article X, Section 1 
of the Idaho Constitution by ruling that IDAPA Rules promulgated by IIXlC on 
November 2, 2012 A7ere a "remedial action?" 
2 Searcy has since A7ithdra.Nl'.l his Article VII,§ 5 claim. Further, the 
district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of IIXlC as to Searcy' s 
Article VII,§§ 2 and 16, I.C. § 18-314, and the hobby craft surcharge claims 
are not part of the subject matter of this appeal. 
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ISSUE III. 
Did the district court err in concluding that the canmissions charged for 
telephone time and commissary goods are funds arising from the sale of goods 
or services under I.C. § 67-3611 Nhere, under the applicable summary judgment 
standards, :O::OC had the burden of satisfying all of the elements of their 
affirmative statutory defense and failed to do so? 
III. STANDARDS OF RE.VIEW 
standards Of Revie11 For Declaratory Judgment Claims: 
Idaho's Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, I.C. §§ 10-1201 et seq., provides 
that "Courts of record 11ithin their respective jurisdictions shall have poller 
to declare rights, status, and other legal relations, Nhether or not further 
relief is or could be claimed." I.C. § 10-1201. "Any person ••• Nhose rights, 
status or other legal relations are affected by a statute ••• may have determined 
any question of construction or validity arising under the ••• statute ••• and 
obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations there under." 
I.C. § 10-1202. The "act is declared to be remedial; its purpose is to settle 
and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity lli th respect to rights, 
status and other legal relations, and is to be liberally construed and 
administered." I.C. § 10-1212. 
Standards Of Revie,1 For Rule 56 Motion For Smmary Judgment: 
Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions for summary 
judgment. "A party seeking •• to obtain a declaratory judgment may ••• move 
llith or llithout supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in that party's 
favor upon all or any part thereof." I.R.C.P. 56 (a). "The judgment sought 
shall be rendered forthllith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on 
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file, together llith the affidavits, if any, sho,;, that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of la,;,." I.R.C.P. 56(c). 
"The fact that the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment 
does not change the applicable standard of revie,;,, and [the] Court must evaluate 
each party's motion on its o,m merits." Intermountain Forest Mgmt., Inc. v. 
La. Pac. Corp., 136 Idaho 233, 235, 31 P.3d 921, 923 (2001 ). "Those standards 
require the district court, and this Court upon revie,;,, to liberally construe 
the facts in the existing record in favor of the nonrnoving party, and to dra,;, 
all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the nonrnoving party." 
Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 469, 716 P.2d 1238, 1241 (1986). If there is 
no genuine issue of material fact, there is only a question of la,;, over ,;,hich 
the Court Nill exercise free revie,;,. Infanger v. City of Salmon, 137 Idaho 
45, 47, 44 P.3d 1100, 1102 (2002). 
"Summary judgment must be entered against the nonrnoving party ,mo fails 
to make a sho,;,ing sufficient to establish existence of an element, tJhich is 
essential to his case and upon tJhich he ,;,ill bear the burden of proof at trial. 11 
McGilvray v. Farmers Ne,;, World Life Insurance Co., 136 Idaho 39, 42, 28 P.3d 
380, 383 (2001) (citing Smith v. Meridian Joint School Dist. No. 2, 128 Idaho 
714, 918 P.2d 583 (1996); State v. Shama Resources Ltd. Partnership, 127 Idaho 
267, 899 P.2d 977 (1995); Radell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102, 765 P.2d 126, 
127 (1988), citing Celotex v. catrett, 477 u.s. 317, 322, 106 s.ct. 2548, 2552, 
91 L.F.d.2d 265, 273 (1986)). "If the nonrnoving party cannot make a sho,;,ing 
on elements essential to his claims, "there can be no genuine issue of material 
fact since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element on the 
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nonrnoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial."" Id., 
at 42 (citing Celotex, 477 u.s. at 322-23, 106 s.cr. at 2552, 91 L.F.d.2d at 
273) • 'Ihe supreme Court exercises free revietl over questions of lall. Sherer 
v. Pocatello School Dist. #25, 143 Idaho 486, 148 P.3d 1232, 1235 (2006). 
IV. ARGUMENT 
ISSUE I. 
The district court erred in concluding that the revenue raised by IIX)C through 
medical co-pays and photocopy fees does not violate Article II, Section 1 of 
the Idaho Constitution and/or Idaho Code Section 20-212 by ruling that IDAPA 
Rules promulgated by IIX)C on November 2, 2012 llere a "remedial action." 
A. The legislature's exclusive poller under Article II, Section 1 of the Idaho 
Constitution to raise revenue, appropriate funds and make lallS. 
Article II of the Idaho Constitution is titled Distribution of Pollers and 
provides: 
§ 1 • Deparbnents of government 
The pollers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct 
departments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or 
collection of persons charged llith the exercise of pollers properly belonging 
to one of these departments shall exercise any pollers properly belonging 
to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed 
or permitted. 
Provision after provision of Idaho's Constitution sets forth that the poller 
to raise revenue and appropriate funds, llhether through taxes, fees or other 
means, ultimately derives from and lies exclusively llith the legislature and 
pursuant to their duly enacted lalls. 
1. The legislature's exclusive po,;rer to raise revenue. 
It is the legislative branch, not the executive or judicial branches, that 
is exclusively empollered to raise revenue and appropriate funds for the state 
of Idaho. 
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Idaho Constitution, Article VII is entitled "Finance and Revenue." It 
provides at Section 2 that the "legislature shall provide such revenue as may be 
needful ••• and applies particularly to revenue for state purposes." Fenton v. 
Board of Cbmm'rs, 20 Idaho 392, 399, 119 P. 41, 43 (1911). It also states at 
Section 6 that the legislature may by laN invest in municipal corporate 
authorities "the poNer to assess and collect taxes for all purposes of such 
corporation." HONever, "such poNer is limited by the taxing poNer authorized by 
the legislature." BreNster v. City of Pocatello, 115 Idaho 502, 768 P.2d 765, / 
767 (1988)(citing Sun Valley Co. v. City of Sun Valley, 109 Idaho 424, 427, 708 
P.2d 147, 150 (1985)). It also sets forth at Section 13 that "No money shall be 
draHn fran the treasury, but in pursuance of appropriations made by laN" and at 
Section 14 that "No money shall be draHn from the county treasuries except ••• in 
such manner and form as shall be prescribed by the legislature. 11 Section 18 1 
provides for the Idaho Millennium Permanent EndoNLilent Fund and that "money ••• may 
be appropriated or otherNise directed to the fund by the legislature" and for the 
"Idaho Millennium Income Fund, ,mich ••• is subject to appropriation as provided 
by laN;" and mandates at Section 16 that the "legislature shall pass all laNs 
necessary to carry out the provisions of this article." 
Idaho Constitution, Article VIII is entitled "Public Indebtedness and 
Subsidies." It provides at section 1 that the "legislature shall not in any 
manner create any debt or debts, liability or liabilities ••• unless the same 
shall be authorized by laN;" states at Section 2A that the "legislature may 
enact laNs authorizing the state to establish a bond bank authority to purchase 
the bonds, notes or other obligations of a municipality ••• as authorized by 
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latl;" sets forth at Section 3A that "Counties of the state may in the manner 
prescribed by latl issue revenue bonds;" declares at Section 3B that "Port 
districts may ••• be financed for ••• and may in the manner prescribed by latl 
issue revenue bonds to finance the costs thereof;" provides at Section 3C that 
"public hospitals ••• may ••• in the manner prescribed by latl, finance the costs 
thereof;" and sets forth at Section 5 that the "legislature may enact latls 
authorizing • • • nonrecourse revenue bonds or other nonrecourse revenue 
obligations and to apply the proceeds thereof in the manner and for the purposes 
heretofore or hereafter authorized by latl. 
Idaho Constitution, Article IX is entitled "Education and Land Schools." 
It provides at Section 3 that the "earnings of the public school permanent 
endoNIDent fund shall be deposited into the public school earnings reserve fund 
and distributed ••• in such manner as may be prescribed by latl;" states at 
Section 10 that the "Universities of Idaho, as established by existing latls, 
is hereby confinned" and that the "regents shall have ••• the control and 
direction of all funds of, and appropriations to, the university, under such 
regulations as may be prescribed by lall;" and sets forth at Section 11 that 
the "permanent endoNIDent funds ••• may be invested ••• pursuant to state latl." 
Idaho Constitution, Article XV is entitled "Water Rights." It provides 
at Section 1 that "use of all tlaters ••• for sale, rental or distribution ••• 
may be hereafter sold, rented, or distributed ••• in the manner prescribed by 
latl;" states at Section 2 that the "right to collect rates or compensation for 
the use of tlater ••• can not be exercised except by authority of and in the manner 
prescribed by latl;" sets forth at Section 6 that the "legislature shall provide 
by latl, the manner in llhich reasonable maximum rates may be established to be 
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charged for the use of .!later sold, rented, or distributed for any useful or 
beneficial purpose;" and mandates at Section 7 that there "shall be constituted 
a Water Resource Agency, canposed as the Legislature may no.ll or hereafter 
prescribe, llhich shall have the po.Iler to ••• issue bonds ••• to be repaid from 
revenues or projects • • • under such la.lls as may be prescribed by the 
Legislature." 
Idaho Constitution, Article XVIII is entitled "County Organization." It 
provides at Section 6 that "all taxes shall be collected by the officer or 
officers designated by la.ll" and that the "legislature shall provide for the 
strict accountability of county, to.llilShip, precinct and municipal officers for 
all fees llhich may be collected by them, and for all public moneys llhich may 
be paid to them, or officially come into their possession." Hollever, "the grant 
of taxing po.Iler ••• is not self-executing or unlimited. It is limited by llhat 
taxing po.Iler the legislature authorizes in its implementing legislation." 
Bre.llster, 115 Idaho 502, 768 P.2d at 766. "[I]f they have no statutory po.Iler to 
do so, then they have no po.Iler llhatever to do so." Fenton, 20 Idaho at 404, 
119 P. at 45. 
Indeed, even llithin the legislature, bills for raising revenue must 
originate in the house of representatives. See Idaho Constitution, Article III, 
Section 1 4. The purpose of incorporating this provision into the constitution 
is that the enactment of la.lls for raising revenue is the exercise of one of 
the highest prerogatives of government and the people have reserved the right 
to decide this necessity to that body of the legislature llhich comes most 
directly from the people. Dumas v. Bryan, 35 Idaho 557, 207 P. 720, 722 (1922); 
J.C. Penney Co. v. Diefendorf, 54 Idaho 374, 392, 32 P.2d 784, 792 (1934) ("It 
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is for the legislature to determine the tax policy of the state, subject only 
to the limitations prescribed by the Constitution."). 
The phrase "as shall be prescribed by lall" means that "the pollers ••• [are] 
statutory and limited, and that such boards can only exercise those pollers 
granted them by statute." Fenton, 20 Idaho at 404, 119 P. at 45. 
2. The legislature's exclusive poller to make lall. 
"The Constitution of the state of Idaho and this Court, through its 
interpretation in the cases cited herein, have clearly established that the 
legislative po'.tler llas vested in the legislature." Mead v. Arnell, 117 Idaho 660, 
664, 791 P.2d 410 (1990). "The courts [and executive] may not substitute their 
o,m llisdom and policy for the Legislature's." Idaho Gold Dredging Co. v. 
Balderston, 58 Idaho 692, 717, 78 P.2d 105, 116 (1938); Troutner v. Kempthome, 
142 Idaho 389, 393, 128 P.3d 926, 930 (2006). 
"One of the settled maxims in constitutional lall is that the poller conferred 
upon the legislature to make lalls cannot be delegated by that department to any 
other body or authority." Mead, 117 Idaho at 665, 791 P.2d 410. The Idaho Supreme 
Court has consistently held that administrative rules or regulations are "less 
than the equivalent of statutory la.tl. 11 Id. 
"While the poller to make lall lies exclusively llithin the province of the 
legislature (Idaho Constitution, art. 3 §§ 1, 15), the legislature may 
constitutionally leave to administrative agencies the selection of the means and 
the time and place of the execution of the legislative purpose, and to that end 
may prescribe suitable rules and regulations." Id., at 664. "Ho.tlever, llhile 
these rules and regulations may be given the 'force and effect of lall,' they do 
not rise to the level of statutory lall. 11 Id. "[W]hat the legislature delegated 
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Nas not a legislative or laN making authority, but, an authority to make rules 
or regulations." Id., at 665. 
Further, the Idaho supreme Court "has consistently found the executive rule 
making authority to be rooted in a legislative delegation, not a poNer 
constitutionally granted to the executive." Id., at 667. 
3. Idaho Code Section 20-212. 
Idaho Cede Section 20-212(a) provides in pertinent part that the "state board 
of correction shall make all necessary rules to carry out the provisions of this 
chapter not inconsistent Mith express statutes or the state constitution[.]" 
NotJh.ere in this statute does it state that ID'.J<: may raise revenue for IIXlC purposes 
outside of Idaho's constitutionally provided legislative process, or that I~ 
may collect commissions or assess monetary charges for services rendered to 
. t 3 1nrna es. 
Searcy filed his Complaint on May 18, 2011. (R, pp.023-076). SUbsequently, 
the district court specifically found that "it is undisputed that the Idaho 
legislature has not enacted any statute specifically authorizing IIXlC to impose 
3 
Prior to bringing this suit, Searcy exhausted all available administrative 
remedies by utilizing the IIXlC Concern Form/ Grievance/ Appeal of Grievance 
("Grievance Process"). (R, pp.028, 049-055 (Complaint, at ,I 25, and at 
Appendix A) ) • 'Ibroughout the Grievance Process, IIXlC employees relied on 
provisions of I.e.§ 20-212 as authorization for their revenue raising scheme. 
(R, pp.053-055 (Complaint, at Appendix A, pgs. 4-6)). 
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the fees, comnissions [and] co-pays ••• .vhich are the subject of the Plaintiff's 
claims. 114 (R, p.512, Ls.12-14). 
Hollever, the district court found that "the record does not currently 
establish .vh.ich, if any, of the policies or procedures imposing the fees llhich 
are the subject of this case llere enacted via the rule-making procedure set forth 
in I.C. § 20-212" (R, p.519, Ls.11-13) and ordered supplemental briefing of both 
parties "on the issue of legislative reviell of the specific policies or procedures 
requiring the collection of the fees remaining in this case." (R, p.519, Ls.19-
20). Only then did IIXlC finally admit that the "IIXlC policies and procedures 
imposing the fees at issue in this case (IIXlC SOP 405.02.01.001, IIXlC Policy 411, 
IIXlC SOP 411.06.03.001, IIXlC Policy 608, and IIXlC SOP 608.02.00.001) llere not 
promulgated in accordance IJ'ith the procedures set forth in Idaho Code§ 20-212[.]" 
(R, p.551). 
B. The district court erred granting surrmary judgment in favor of IIXlC on 
Searcy's Article II, Section 1 and Idaho Code Section 20-212 claims. 
The district court specifically found "the legislature has not explicitly 
provided for the specific fees at issue in this case via statute." (R, p.733, 
Ls.22-23). Thus, it is against this finding and the above described backdrop 
of Idaho constitutional, statutory and case lall, and the procedural history of 
this case, that the district court ultimately ruled that: 
4 Searcy maintains at Issue III, beloll, that the phone and comnissary revenue 
are not raised pursuant to I.e.§ 67-3611. Therefore, that revenue also applies 
to and is the subject of this Issue I and Issue • II ,1 belo.v. 
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"[I]n the time since the filing of this Court's Merrorandum Decision and Order 
on June 13, 2012, IDAPA Rules have been promulgated setting the IIX>C fee 
structure, including the hobby craft surcharge, the photocopy fee, and the 
medical co-pay fee" and concluded that "[b]ecause the Defendants have taken 
remedial action to promulgate IDA.PA rules subject to legislative oversight, 
the court finds notJ that the hobby craft surcharge, the photocopy fee, and 
the medical co-pay fee are not a violation of the separation of potJers bettJeen 
the executive and legislative branches of state government pursuant to Idaho 
Constitution, Article II, Section 1. In addition, the Court finds that any 
claim made by the Plaintiff that the fees in question should have been 
promulgated as rules pursuant to I.C. § 20-212, is moot." 
(R, p.734, Ls.15-17 and 21-24 - p.735, Ls.2). 
Respectfully, the district court erred. 
According to II:XX:'., their authority to make rules tJhich raise revenue is 
implied under the umbrella of their general authority to have the control, 
direction and management of the penitentiaries. See, e.g., R, pp.419-421; 
pp.546-552. HotJever, this argument begs the Court to ignore the overtlhelrning 
body of Idaho constitutional and statutory latJ, and its interpretation by the 
Idaho supreme Court, that the potJer to raise revenue is not implied, but must 
be expressly and specifically granted by the legislature and that ultimately, 
the potJer to raise revenue comes from the legislature. 
IIX::>C's argument is further undermined by the fact that the legislature has 
provided them, in numerous instances, tJith express statutory authority for other 
types of revenue raising and monetary assessments. See, e.g., I.C. § 20-102A 
(express statutory authority for the penitentiary earnings reserve fund); 
§ 20-103 (authority for the penitentiary income fund);§ 20-2090 (authority for 
forfeiture of contraband property or money found in possession of inmates); 
§ 20-225 (authority for payment of cost of supervision under probation and parole); 
§ 20-225A (authority for interstate compact application fee);§ 20-241 (authority 
to accept federal and other funds);§ 20-242 (authority for furloughed prisoners 
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to pay prisoner's board, personal expenses, and costs of administering such 
prisoner's tJOrk furlough program); and § 20-245 (authority to charge offenders 
performing cormnunity service tJOrk an hourly fee for purposes of providing NOrker's 
compensation insurance) • 
IIXJC's p::isition begs the question tih.y, if they possess the implied authority 
to impose fees upon those in their supervision to offset costs, is it necessary 
for the legislature to pass these numerous other laNs tih.ich expressly raise revenue 
for IIXJC if IIXJC already has this implied authority? 
The ans,;rer to this question is simple: the legislature did not "perfor:m an 
idle act by enacting a meaningless provision." Roberts v. Board of Trustees, 
Pocatello School District No. 25, 134 Idaho 890, 893, 11 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2000). 
Instead, the legislature did tihat only the legislature can do - it passed laNs 
Nhich expressly and specifically raised revenue for IIXlC as part of the 
legislature's exclusive constitutional mandate to raise revenue and support the 
state's penal institutions. IIXlC's raising of revenue Nithout express statutory 
authority invades the province of the legislature. 
1. 'l'tle Idaho Supreme Court held in Mead v. Arnell that administrative 
rules do not rise to the level of statutory laN, thus, IIXlC's IDAPA 
Rules promulgated on November 2, 2013 are not an adequate "remedial 
action." 
The district court's ruling infers that IlXlC's IDAPA rules, only promulgated 
after and under the pressure of this litigation, rise to the level of statutory 
laN. The Idaho Supreme Court has already held other rise in Mead v. Arnell, and 
the district court erred in this regard. 
"'Ihe Constitution of the state of Idaho and this Court, through its 
interpretation in the cases cited herein, have clearly established that the 
legislative p::>Ner Nas vested in the legislature." Mead v. Arnell, 117 Idaho 660, 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 24 
664, 791 P.2d 410 (1990). "The courts [and executive] may not substitute their 
o,m N"isdom and policy for the legislature's." Idaho Gold Dredging Co. v. 
Balderston, 58 Idaho 692, 717, 78 P.2d 105, 116 (1938); Troutner v. Kempthorne, 
142 Idaho 389, 393, 128 P.3d 926, 930 (2006). 
"One of the settled maxims in constitutional laN" is that the poller conferred 
upon the legislature to make lalls cannot be delegated by that department to any 
other l:xx'iy or authority." Mead v. Arnell, 117 Idaho at 665, 791 P.2d 410. The 
Idaho Supreme Court has consistently held that administrative rules or 
regulations are "less than the equivalent of statutory lall. 11 Id. 
"While the poller to make lall lies exclusively lli thin the province of the 
legislature (Idaho Constitution, art. 3 ~§ 1, 15), the legislature may 
constitutionally leave to administrative agencies the selection of the means 
and the time and place of the execution of the legislative purpose, and to that 
end may prescribe suitable rules and regulations." Mead, at 664. "Rollever, 
llhile these rules and regulations may be given the 'force and effect of lall,' 
they do not rise to the level of statutory lall. 11 Id. "[W]hat the legislature 
delegated t1as not a legislative or lall making authority, but, an authority to 
make rules or regulations." Id., at 665. 
Further, the Idaho Supreme Court "has consistently found the executive 
rule making authority to be rooted in a legislative delegation, not a poN'er 
constitutionally granted to the executive." Id., at 667. 
Another very similar and excellent case of Smith v. Florida Department 
of Corrections, 920 So.2d 638 (Fla. Dist. ct. App. 2005) holds that the poN'er 
to raise revenue is statutory and limited, and that the only pollers that may 
be exercised by executive branch agencies are those specifically granted by 
statute. Its holding is entirely consonant llith this Court's om holdings 
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lU Mead V. Arnell. 
In Smith, the court held that a fee charged for photocopying services by 
the Florida Deparbnent of Corrections to inmates tJas not supported by a specific 
grant of legislative authority and tJas therefore invalid. Id., at 643. 
"Nollhere in this statute does it say that the Department may, in the discharge 
of its supervisory authority over inmates in the state corrections system, assess 
monetary charges for services rendered to those inmates." Id., at 642. "[T]here 
is no specific grant of authority in this statute for the assessment by the 
Deparbnent or monetary costs for any particular service provided to inmates 
by the Deparbnent." Id. 
"A proposed or existing rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative 
authority if the agency has exceeded its grant of rule making authority ••• 
or the rule enlarges, rncxlifies, or contravenes the specific provisions of the 
latJ implemented." Id., at 640-41. 
"A grant of rulemaking authority is necessary but not sufficient to allo.tJ 
an agency to adopt a rule; a specific la.tJ to be implemented is also required. 
An agency may adopt only rules that implement or interpret the specific pollers 
and duties granted by the enabling statute. No agency shall have authority 
to adopt a rule only because it is reasonably related to the purpose of the 
enabling legislation and is not arbitrary or capricious or is tJithin the agency's 
class of pollers and duties, nor shall an agency have the authority to implement 
statutory provisions setting forth general legislative intent or policy. 
Statutory language granting rulemaking authority or generally describing the 
pollers and functions of an agency shall be construed to extend no further than 
implementing or interpreting the specific pollers and duties conferred by the 
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same statute." Id., at 641. 
The Smith court noted that "[i]f [the statute] llere interpreted in the 
manner set forth by the Department, the Deparbnent !lould have unbridled 
discretion to charge an inmate for any and all services rendered by the 
Department. While one may argue that this is appropriate public policy, such 
a policy decision should be made by the Legislature rather than the executive 
branch." Id., at 642. 
Like!lise, in this instant appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court must also be 
cognizant of the broader implications of IDOC's arguments. Taken to its logical 
and inevitable conclusion, IDOC's position NOuld alloll virtually every executive 
branch department the implied, unbridled discretion to independently raise 
revenue under the umbrella of their other substantive pollers. This slippery 
slope NOuld result in the unraveling of the form of government set forth in 
Idaho's constitution, llould by necessity undermine every Idaho Supreme Court 
decision touching on the subject of separation of pollers, and !lould reopen the 
question that !las already resolved by the framers of our constitution - What 
then is the legislature for? 
IDOC's revenue raising scheme invades the province of the legislature 
and violates Idaho Constitution, Article II, Section 1 and Idaho Code Section 
20-212. The district court erred by ruling otherllise. 
2. In the alternative, if IDOC's IDAPA Rules are an adequate "remedial 
action," Searcy is still entitled to judgment and damages for the 
revenue raised prior to November 2, 2012. 
The district court took judicial notice that :O::XX: promulgated IDAPA Rules 
effective November 2, 2012. According to the district court, "[b]ecause the 
Defendants have taken remedial action to promulgate ID~PA rules subject to 
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legislative oversight, the court finds OON that the ••• photocopy fees, and 
the medical co-pay fee are not a violation of the separation of poNers betNeen 
the executive and legislative branches of state government pursuant to Idaho 
Constitution Article II, Section 1. In addition, the Court finds that any claim 
made by the Plaintiff that the fees in question should have been promulgated 
as rules pursuant to I.e.§ 20-212, is moot." (R, p.734, Ls.21 - p.735, Ls.2). 
This is error. These IDAPA rules Nere only promulgated after and under 
the pressure of this litigation. As set forth above, Searcy disputes that they 
serve as an adequate remedy to specific statutory authority in the first 
instance. Ho.Never, if this Court holds otherNise, then Searcy is still entitled 
to judgment and damages for the revenue raised prior to these IDAPA rules going 
into effect on November 2, 2012. See, SNeeney v. American Nat. Bank, et al., 
62 Idaho 544, 115 P. 2d 1 09, 111 ( 1 941 ) ( "The rule seems to be Nell settled that 
in a proceeding for declaratory judgment the court has jurisdiction ••• to a.Nard 
damages."); Hausam v. Schnabl, 126 Idaho 569, 573, 887 P.2d 1076, 1080 (ct. 
App. 1994 ( "The unjust enrichment doctrine ••• alloNS recovery Nhere the 
defendant has received a benefit from the plaintiff Nhich it NOUld be inequitable 
to retain Nithout compensating the plaintiff for the value of the benefit." 
(citing Continental Forest Products, Inc. v. Chandler, 95 Idaho 739, 743, 518 
P.2d 1201, 1205 (1974))); see also Addendum A, attached hereto. 
This Court should reverse and remand back to the district court for this 
alternative reason also. 
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ISSUE II. 
The district court erred in concluding that the revenue raised by IIXlC through 
medical co-pays and photocopy fees does not violate Article X, Section 1 of 
the Idaho Constitution by ruling that IDAPA Rules promulgated by IIXlC on 
November 2, 2012 ilere a "remedial action." 
Searcy incorporates in its entirety his argument fran Issue I, above, into 
this Issue II argument. 
Idaho Constitution, Article X, Section 1, provides that" ••• penal 
institutions ••• shall be established and supported by the state in such manner 
as may be prescribed by laii. 11 It "is a direction to establish the institution, 
and authorizes state support but does not make such support exclusive nor 
prescribe hoi! or from A7hat sources the necessary funds shall be obtained, but 
leaves that to the legislature." State ex rel. Macey v. Johnson, 50 Idaho 363, 
368, 296 P. 588, 589 (1931). 
Hoilever, rather than "leaving it to the legislature," IIXlC has chosen to 
independently establish the state's policy by itself and has created a revenue 
raising scheme that is utterly ilithout legislative authority. 
IIXlC's .vhole case boils doiln to their assertion that their authority to 
raise the revenue at issue is implied under the umbrella of their "express 
constitutional and statutory authority to control, direct and manage the 
correctional facilities, Idaho Constitution, Article X, ~ 5, Idaho Code~ 20-
209, as i!ell as express statutory authority to adopt rules and regulations for 
the government and discipline of the correctional facilities. Idaho Code§ 
20-224." (R, p.556). 
By its om terms, the ISBOC's authority under Idaho Constitution, 
Article X, Section 5 to "have control, direction and management of the 
penitentiaries of the state" is limited by the phrase "Mith such compensation, 
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po!17ers and duties as may be prescribed by la!17. 11 There is no exclusive, 
independent authority under this provision to raise revenue for state purposes. 
Notably, :O:X:X::: is unable to cite a single constitutional provision, statute, 
or Idaho Supreme Court decision that says that the po!17er to raise revenue may 
be implied under the umbrella of other substantive po!17ers. 
IIXlC is essentially asking the Court to do t,170 things regarding this 
provision, l:x:>th of !17hich the Court cannot do. 
First, by arguing that the phrase "this board shall have the control, 
direction and management of the penitentiaries of the state" someho/17 gives IDOC 
exclusive, independent and unlimited po!17ers, IDOC is asking the Court to give 
no effect to and to read out of the constitution the latter phrase of 11 !17ith 
such compensation, po!17ers, and duties as may be prescribed by la!17. 11 This Court 
has already held that the phrase "as shall be prescribed by la/1111 means that 
"the po!17ers ••• [are] statutory and limited, and that such boards can only 
exercise those po!17ers granted them by statute." Fenton, 20 Idaho at 404, 119 
P. at 45. 
Second, IDOC is asking the Court to read into the tJOrds "control, direction 
and management" an exclusive, independent and unlimited po!17er to raise revenue 
in any ila.Y that it sees fit. 
The Court should not do either of these t,170 things. 
IDOC's arguments miss the !17hole point of Searcy's case. It is not a 
challenge to their control, direction and management of the penal system. 
Rather, it challenges their authority, po!17er and the legality as to the manner 
in !17h.ich they independently raise revenue in light of Idaho's constitutional 
and statutory scheme on this subject. 
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IDJC's revenue raising scheme exceeds the scope of authority granted under 
Idaho Constitution, Article X, Section 5. It violates Idaho Constitution, 
Article X, Section 1 and the district court erred by ruling otherllise. 
Additionally and in the alternative, the district court ruled, as to Idaho 
Constitution, Article X, § 5, that IlX)C has "taken appropriate remedial action 
to adopt IDAPA Rules concerning the department's fee structure[.]" (R, p. 736, 
Ls. 18-19). 
As set forth above, this is error. These IDAPA rules llere only promulgated 
after and under the pressure of this litigation and they are not an adequate 
remedy to the lack of specific statutory authority in the first instance. 
Hollever, if this Court holds otherllise, then Searcy is still entitled to judgment 
and damages for the revenue raised prior to these IDAPA rules going into effect 
on November 2, 2012. See, Slleeney v. American Nat. Bank, et al., 62 Idaho 544, 
115 P.2d 109, 111 (1941) ("The rule seems to be llell settled that in a proceeding 
for declaratory judgment the court has jurisdiction •• to allard damages."); 
Hausam v. Schnabl, 126 Idaho 569, 573, 887 P.2d 1076, 1080 (ct. App. 1994) ("The 
unjust enrichment doctrine ••• allolls recovery llhere the defendant has received 
a benefit fran the plaintiff llhich it llould be inequitable to retain llithout 
canpensating the plaintiff for the value of the benefit." (citing Continental 
Forest Products, Inc. v. Chandler, 95 Idaho 739, 743, 518 P.2d 1201, 1205 
(1974))); see also Addendum A, attached hereto. 
This Court should reverse and remand back to the district court for this 
alternative reason also. 
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ISSUE III. 
The district court erred in concluding that the commissions charged for telephone 
time and commissary goods are funds arising from the sale of goods or services 
under I.C. § 67-3611 tJh.ere, under the applicable summary judgment standards, 
IIXlC had the burden of satisfying all of the elements of their affirmative 
statutory defense and failed to do so. 
As discussed above at Footnote 3, prior to bringing this suit Searcy 
specifically asked I:00:, as to the telephone and commissary revenue, that "If 
you maintain that these takings and revenue raising is legal, please cite the 
statute you rely on for your authority to do this." (R, p.053 (Complaint, at 
Appendix A, p:J. A-4)). IIXlC made no claim, reference or reliance on I.C. § 
67-3611 and instead relied on language and provisions from I.C. § 20-212 as 
authorization for their revenue raising scheme. (R, pp.053-055 (Complaint, 
at Appendix A, p:Js. 4-6)). 
In Searcy's Civil Complaint he alleges at Paragraph 35 that IIXlC "illegally 
diverted rroneys belonging to Plaintiff Searcy and thousands of other persons 
for IIXlC uses, Nithout express constitutional or statutory authority to do so, 
through phone and commissary sales commissions[.]" (R, p.030, at ,r 35). 
In their Anstver, IIXlC made no reference to, reliance upon, nor plead any 
defense based upon I.C. § 67-3611. (R, pp.088-095). Within the scope of their 
OA711 motion for summary judgment, IIXlC again made no reference to, reliance upon, 
nor plead any defense based upon I.C. ~ 67-3611. (R, pp.191-193, 411-435). 
IIXlC did not disclose their defense and reliance on I.C. ~ 67-3611 for the first 
time until filing the last document in the parties' cross-motions for summary 
judgment, just days before the already scheduled hearing date. (R, p.503). 
In his partial motion for summary judgment against IIXlC as to Count I, 
Searcy alleges, as to "IIXlC's revenue raising through phone and commissary sales 
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canmissions" that IIXJC had "no authority for raising revenue or raising fees[.]" 
(R, p. 172). 
As an affirmative defense that IIXlC had the burden of proving all of the 
elements at trial, IIXJC asserted, and the district court erroneously concluded, 
that the phone and canmissary revenue 1vas raised under the authority of I.C. 
§ 67-3611. (R, p.503, pp.514, Ls.20 - 517, Ls.22). 
As the nonmoving party, IIXlC did not meet the burden of their defense. 
"Sumnary judgment must be entered against the nonmoving party Nho fails 
to make a shoring sufficient to establish existence of an element, 1vhich is 
essential to his case and upon Nhich he 1vill bear the burden of proof at trial." 
McGilvray, 136 Idaho at 42, 28 P.3d at 383 (citations omitted). "If the 
nonmoving party cannot make a sho1ving on elements essential to his claims, "there 
can be no genuine issue of material fact since a complete failure of proof 
concerning an essential element on the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders 
all other facts immaterial."" Id. (citation omitted). 
A. The Essential Elements of I.C. § 67-3611. 
Idaho Cooe Section 67-3611 provides: 
67-3611. EXPENDITURE OF FUNDS FROM SALE OF SERVICES, RENTALS OR SALE 
OF PRODUCTS BY STA'IE INSTITUTIONS. All state institutions, educational, 
charitable, penal and other1vise, shall be allo1ved to expend the funds 
arising from the sale of services, rentals of personal property, stock, 
fam or garden produce, or other goods, or article produced 1vithin or by 
the institution, for the maintenance, use and support of said institution, 
1vithout reducing the amount of the appropriations made to such institutions; 
all such sums received shall be deposited 1vith the state treasurer and it is 
hereby made the duty of the state controller and the state treasurer to 
enter deposits so received in the general fund of the state, and the state 
controller shall add the deposits so received to the appropriations made 
to such institutions severally; and the sums of money so received are hereby 
appropriated from the general fund of the state of Idaho for the 
maintenance, use and support of the institution by Nhich the same are so 
received; and the said moneys shall be expended for the use and support 
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of such institution for Alhich the same tJere deposited, and shall be audited 
and accounted for as other appropriations to the said institution are. 
( emphasis added) • 
HotJever, the provisions of I.C. § 67-3611 are specifically limited by the 
tenns of Idaho Code Section 67-3602, Alhich provides: 
67-3602. PAYMENT OF SALARIES AND WAGES. No portion of any appropriation 
made for expenses other than salaries and tJages shall be expended in payment 
of salaries and tJages; but tJith the consent of the state board of examiners, 
any portion of any appropriation made for the payment of salaries and tJages 
may be expended for other expenses of the particular office or institution 
for Alhich it is appropriated. 
Therefore, by its o,m tenns, I.C. § 67-3611 requires that in order for 
funds to be construed to be raised or appropriated pursuant to the statute, 
the follotJing essential elements must be satisfied: 
(a) that "no portion of any appropriation made for expenses other than 
salaries and tJages shall be expended in payment of salaries and tJages" 
(see I.e.§ 67-3602); 
(b) that "such sums received shall be deposited tJith the state treasurer" 
and "so received in the general fund of the state;" and that "the 
sums of money so received are hereby appropriated from the general 
fund of the state;" and 
(c) that the funds must arise "from the sale of services ••• or other 
goods, or article 'produced tJithin or by the institution[.]"' Id. 
( emphasis added) • 
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B. IIXlC has failed to make a shelling of the essential elements of their 
I.e.§ 67-3611 defense. 
1 • IIXlC has failed to sho.v that no :EX>rtion of the funds raised by the 
telephone and ccmnissary ccmnissions tvere "expended in the payment 
of salaries and .llages." 
This is an essential element that :moc is required to prove at trial in 
asserting their r.e. ~ 67-3611 defense. See r.e. ~ 67-3602. Theyhavenot done 
so. 
Indeed, the documents submitted to the Court by IlXX; in the cross-motion 
summary judgment proceedings actually indicate the opposite - that the funds 
are in fact being "expended in payment of salaries and .llages." (See, R, pp.316-
317 (Affidavit of Shirley Audens at ,i: 15 ("In addition, some personnel costs 
for various positions are paid from the IMF including the legal assistant/ 
paralegal in the Resource Center, the correctional officer in the Recreation 
Department, the Religious Activities Coordinator and the Financial Specialist 
.llho monitors the IMF."))). 
The scope of the allegations in Searcy' s Civil Complaint, at Paragraph 35, 
that IlXX; "illegally diverted moneys belonging to Plaintiff Searcy and thousands 
of other persons for IlXX; uses, .llithout express constitutional or statutory 
authority to do so, through phone and commissary sales camnissions" (R, p.030, 
at ,i: 35), squarely challenges the legality of nx::ic' s phone and cormnissary revenue 
scheme. Searcy has a right to "have determined any question of construction 
or validity arising under the ••• statute •• and obtain a declaration of rights, 
status or other legal relations there under." I.e.§ 10-1202. 
I~ has failed to sho.ll the essential element that the funds raised through 
telephone and commissary revenue .llere not "expended in payment of salaries and 
.llages." See I.e.§ 67-3602; 67-3611. 
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2. IlXlC has failed to she.Ai' that the funds received are deposited "in 
the general fund" and appropriated "from the general fund." 
This also is an essential element that rr.x::>C is required to prove at trial 
in asserting their I.C. § 67-3611 defense. They have not done so. 
Indeed, the documents sul::xnitted to the Court by rr.x::>C in the cross-motion 
summary judgment proceedings actually indicate that the funds .Ai'ere not received 
in and appropriated from the C,eneral Fund. Rather, IlXlC' s o,m submissions 
indicate that the telephone and commissary rever:iue Has received in and 
appropriated from the Miscellaneous Revenue Fund. (See, R, p.195, at mi: 4-5 
(Statement of Material Facts, at ,-r 4 ("'Ihe IlXlC is funded primarily from the 
State General Fund. Other funding sources include, but are not necessarily 
limited to, endo..vrnent income, cost of supervision fees, inmate labor, federal 
grants, and miscellaneous revenue. See Affidavit of Shirley Audens [R, pp.316], 
,112.") and at ,I 5 ("The Miscellaneous Revenue Fund, Alhich makes up part of the 
annual budget appropriated by the Legislature for the operation of the state 
correction system, includes money from the inmate management fund (Il\'JF). The 
IMF is made up of money that is collected by the rr.x::>C and deposited in the state 
treasury. CUrrently, as set forth in IlXlC SOP 114.03.03.014 (Revenue: Offender 
Management Fund), the source of these monies includes, but is not limited to: 
telephone revenue; commissary revenue, vending revenue; laundry revenue; donation 
revenue; and social security revenue. See Aff of SA, [R, pp.316] ,-r14. See 
also Civil Complaint, mI37, 52.")). 
While IlXlC may argue that it is the duty of the state contoller and/or 
state treasurer to ensure the funds flo.Ai' in and out of the General Fund instead 
of the Miscellaneous Fund (See I.e.~ 67-3611), there are t.Ai'o important problems 
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,.,rith this argument, both of ,.,rhich lie squarely upon IIX)C rather than the state 
controller or treasurer. 
First and foremost, IlXlC's hands are not clean in the matter. Indeed, 
IDOC Financial Specialist Sr. Shirley Aud.ens testified at~ 8 of her affidavit 
that even though it is supposedly "the policy of the Board of Correction that 
the IDOC shall manage its fiscal responsibilities in accordance ,.,rith ••• the 
la,.,rs of the state of Idaho" (R, p.314, at~ 8), it is also IDOC's o,m policy 
to "deposit incoming funds from the folloring sources into the State of Idaho 
miscellaneous revenue fund ••• Telephone revenue [and] Commissary revenue." 
(R, p.360 (Exhibit F of Affidavit of Shirley Audens (IIX)C SOP 114.03.03.014 
(Revenue: Offender Management Fund), GENERAL REQUIREMENTS, at Section 1. Incoming 
Funds, at P:J. 3 of 8 (emphasis added)))). This is specifically contrary to 
"the la,.,rs of the State of Idaho" if this is money raised pursuant to I.C. § 
67-3611. Thus, it is IlXlC themselves ,mo are responsible for depositing the 
telephone and corrmissary revenue into the Miscellaneous Fund rather than the 
General Fund. 
Second, to the extent that the state controller and/or state treasurer 
are liable and must be brought into the suit as Third-Parties, IDOC has failed 
to comply ,.,rith Rule 14(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, ,mich provides: 
(a) Third Party Practice-When Defendant May Bring in Third Party. At 
any time after commencement of the action a defendant as a third-party 
plaintiff may cause to be served a summons and complaint upon a person 
not a party to the action ,,rho is or may be liable to such third-party 
plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against the third-
party plaintiff. The third-party plaintiff need not obtain leave to make 
the service if the third-party plaintiff files the third-party complaint 
not later than 10 days after serving the original ans,.,rer. Otherrise, the 
third-party plaintiff must obtain leave on motion upon notice to all parties 
to the action. The person so served, hereinafter called the third-party 
defendant, shall make any defenses to the third-party plaintiff's claim 
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as provided in Rule 12 and any counterclaims against the third-party 
plaintiff and cross-claims against other third-party defendants as provided 
in Rule 13. The third-party defendant may assert against the plaintiff 
any defenses Nhich the third-party plaintiff has to the plaintiff's claim. 
The third-party defendant may also assert any claim against the plaintiff 
arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter 
of the plaintiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff. The plaintiff 
may assert any claim against the third-party defendant arising out of the 
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's 
claims against the third-party plaintiff, and the third-party defendant 
thereupon shall assert any defenses as provided in Rule 12 and any 
counterclaims and cross-claims as provided in Rule 1 3. Any party may move 
for severance, separate trial, or dismissal of the third-party claim; and 
the court may direct a final judgment upon either the original claim or the 
third-party claim alone in accordance Mith the provisions of Rule 54(b) ~·. A 
third-party defendant may proceed under this rule against any person not 
a party to the action Nho is or may be liable to the third-party defendant 
for all of part of the claim made in the action against the third-party 
defendant. 
(emphasis added). 
If IlX)C Nishes to blame the fact that the phone and commissary revenue 
floNS in and out of the Miscellaneous Fund rather than the General Fund on the 
state controller and/or state treasurer, they are free to do so and Rule 14(a) 
provides them the procedural doorNay. But to date, they have not met their 
om responsibility to request leave to do this. Regardless, Nhether IlX)C makes 
the state controller and/or state treasurer Third-Parties or not, JIXJC:: still 
has the burden of proving the existence of every essential element of their 
I.C. § 67-3611 defense and have not done so. 
The "General Fund" remains an essential element at trial to IDOC's I.C. 
§ 67-3611 defense. IDOC has failed to shoN the essential element that the funds 
raised through telephone and commissary revenue are received in, and appropriated 
from, the General Fund. 
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3. IIXX:! has failed to sho11 that the telephone and ccmnissary funds 
arise "frcm the sale of services, ••• or other goods, or article 
'proouced 11ithin or by the institution."' 
An essential element of Idaho Code Section 67-3611 that must be satisfied 
by IlX)C is that the telephone and corrmissary funds arise "from the sale of 
services, ••• or other goods, or article 'produced 11ithin or by the 
institution.'" IlX)C has failed to do so. 
Statutory construction must begin J'lith the literal NOrds of the statute: 
those 11ords must be given their plain, usual and ordinary meaning; and the 
statute must be construed as a llhole. Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'l Med. 
ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011). 
The plain, usual and ordinary meaning of the NOrd "produce" is "to make 
or manufacture [to produce steel]." Webster's Ne11 World Dictionary of the 
American language, Second College Edition (1984). 
IIXJC set forth in their cross-motion surrnnary judgment submissions that 
they "allo11 the use of the telephones to inmates based on security needs and 
resources." (R, p.317, at~ 18 (Affidavit of Shirley Audens at~ 18 )). 
Ho11ever, IlX)C has not put forth any evidence that this allo11ed use of telephones 
is, in fact, a ser.vice "produced" (i.e., "made or manufactured") "11ithin or 
by the institution." IX>cuments submitted by IIXJC actually indicate other11ise -
that this telephone service is merely brought into the institution (as opposed 
to "produced 11ithin or by the institution") from the outside by a contract 
telephone vendor. (R, p.317, at~ 18 (Affidavit of Shirley Audens at~ 18 (IMF 
"is partially comprised of funds from telephone revenue, 11hich is the commission 
agreed upon by the IIXJC and the telephone vendor."))). 
Like11ise, IlX)C set forth in their cross-motion summary judgment submissions 
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that a general description of the cormnissary goods is "the alloNed. food products, 
med.ical, dental, and grooming items, and electronic equip:nent not provided. by 
the Department of Correction but approved. for use." (R, p.317, at 1"[ 17 
(Affidavit of Shirley Audens at 1"[ 17 (See, R, p.388 (Exhibit H), Policy 406, 
at pg. 3))). HoNever, IIXX'. has not put forth any evidence that these items 
are, in fact, "produced." (i.e. , "made or manufactured.") "Ni thin or by the 
institution." rocuments submitted. by IIXX'. indicate otherNise - that these goods 
are merely brought into the institution (as opposed. to "produced." Nithin or 
by the institution) by a contract cormnissary vendor. (R, p.317, at 1"[ 17 
(IMF "is partially comprised. of funds from cormnissary revenue, Nhich is the 
contracted. sales percentage cormnission agreed upon by the~ and the cormnissary 
vendor. " ) ) ) • 
The question is tJhether the phrase in I.C. § 67-3611 of "produced. Nithin 
or by the institution" only modi.fies the NOrd "article" or, as Searcy asserts, 
modi.fies the entire list of items preced.ing that term (i.e., "the sale of 
services, rentals of personal property, stock, farm or garden produce, or other 
goods, or article" produced. Nithin or by the institution). 
"The interpretation of a statute is a question of laN over Nhich this Court 
exercises free revieN. 11 BHC rntennountain Hospital, Inc. v. Ada County, 150 
Idaho 93, 95, 244 P.3d 237 (2010) (citing State v. Hensley, 145 Idaho 852, 855, 
187 P.3d 1227, 1230 (2008). 
"The interpretation of a statute 'must begin Nith the literal NOrds of 
the statute; those NOrds must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; 
and the statute must be construed. as a tJhole. If the statute is not ambiguous, 
this Court does not construe it, but simply folloNs the laN as Nritten." Ada 
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County Prosecuting Attorney v. 2007 Legendary Motorcycle, 154 Idaho 351, 353, 
298 P.3d 245 (2013) (citing Verska, 151 Idaho at 893, 265 P.3d at 506 (quoting 
state v. Schlla.rtz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003))). "A statute 
is ambiguous Nb.ere the language is capable of more than one reasonable 
construction." Id., at 353 (citing Porter v. Bd. of Trustees, Preston School 
Dist. No. 201, 141 Idaho 11, 14, 105 P.3d 671, 674 (2004)). 
The Court "ITR.Ist look to the grarrmatical construction of the statute as 
the legislature intended the statute to be construed according to generally 
accepted principles of English grarrrnar." State v. CollinstJorth, 96 Idaho 910, 
914, 538 P.2d 263 (1975) (citing Nagel v. Hammond, 90 Idaho 96, 408 P.2d 468 
(1965)). ''When punctuation discloses a proper legislative intent or conveys 
a clear meaning the courts should give tJeight to it as evidence." 2A Sutherland 
Statutory Construction§ 47:15 (5th ed. 1992). "Where a sentence contains 
several antecedents and several consequents they are to be read distributively." 
Id., at§ 47:26. 
Here, the correct reading of I.C. § 67-3611 is that the phrase "produced 
.tJithin or by the institution," modifies the entire phrase "the sale of services, 
rentals or personal property, stock, fann or garden produce, or other goods, 
or article" and does not only modify the tJord "article." Under this correct 
reading, the phrase provides for both the literal statutory tJording intent, 
and the legislative intent, that "the funds arising from the sale of" shall 
limit such sales of "services, rentals of personal property, stock, fann or 
garden produce, or other goods, or article" to only those "produced tJithin or 
by the institution." 
OthertJise, if the phrase "produced tJithin or by the institution" is read 
to only modify "article," then "the sale of services, rentals of personal 
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property, stock, fann or garden produce, or other goods," tJould be virtually 
unlimited. But an "article," and only an "article," tJould have any limits 
tJhatsoever, that being the article must be "produced tJithin or by the 
institution." Under this definition and construction, confusion tJould reign 
as to tJhether the object of the sale tJas an article (subject to the limiting 
phrase) or one of the other listed items (not subject to the limiting phrase). 
This tJOuld lead to an absurd result. HotJever, this can be reconciled tJi th 
the correct vietJ that the intent of the drafters should prevail by assuming 
that the legislature tJOuld never have intended an absurd result. Thus, the 
correct reading of I.C. § 67-3611 is that the phrase "produced tJithin or by 
the institution" modifies the entire phrase "the sale of services, rentals of 
personal property, stock, fann or garden produce, or other goods, or article." 
An essential element of Idaho Code Section 67-3611 that must be satisfied 
by IIX)C is that the sale of services or goods must be from goods or services 
"produced tJithin or by the institution." IIX)C has failed to do so. 
"Surrmary judgment must be entered against the nonmoving party tJho fails 
to make a shotJing sufficient to establish existence of an element, tJhich is 
essential to his case and upon tJhich he tJill bear the burden of proof at trial." 
McGilvray, 136 Idaho at 42, 28 P.3d at 383 (citations omitted). "If the 
nonmoving party cannot make a shotJing on elements essential to his claims, "there 
can be no genuine issue of material facts since a complete failure of proof 
concerning an essential element on the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders 
all other facts immaterial. 1111 Id., at 42 ( citation omitted). 
Respectfully, Searcy is entitled to surrmary judgment in his favor and the 
district court erred ruling othertJise. 
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V. cna:.uSION 
The district court erred in issuing the j udgrnent and orders a..iarding summary 
judgment in favor of IlXlC as to Count I of the Civil Complaint. These orders 
and judgment should be reversed. As set forth herein, this Court should allard 
summary judgment in favor of Searcy as to Count I of the Civil Complaint and 
remand for further proceedings consistent llith this Court's opinion. Searcy 
should be allarded his costs on appeal pursuant to Rule 40 of the Idaho Appellate 
Rules. 
Respectfully submitted this 1st day of May, 2014. 
Plaintiff-Appellant, prose 
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IDAHO ADMINISTRATIVE CODE 
Idaho Department of Correction 
013. DEPARTMENT FEE STRUCTURE. 
IDAPA 06.01.01 
Rules of the Board of Correction 
In order to help the Department defray the cost of various services provided to offenders, the Department may charge 
the following fees. ' (11-2-12) 
01. Presentence Investigation Fee. Pursuant to Section 19-2516, Idaho Code, if a court orders a 
presentence investigation to be conducted, the court shall order the defendant to pay up to one hundred dollars ($100) 
as determined by the Department as repayment for the cost of conducting the presentence investigation and preparing 
the presentence investigation report. ( 11-2-12) 
02. Cost of Supervision Fee. Pursuant to Section 20-225, Idaho Code-, the Department may charge 
offenders who are on probation or parole supervision a fee up to seventy-five dollars ($75) per month. Costs of 
supervision are the direct and indirect costs incurred by the Department to supervise probationers and parolees, 
including tests to determine drug and alcohol use; books, and written materials to supp9rt rehabilitation efforts, and 
monitoring of physical location through the use of technology. (11-2-12) 
03. Interstate Compact Application Fee. Pursuant to Section 20-225A, Idaho Code, the Department 
may charge any person under state probation or parole supervision who applies for a transfer of supervision to 
another state an application fee up to one hundred dollars ($100). (11-2-12) 
04. Maintenance/Room and Board Fee. Pursuant to Section 20-242, Idaho Code, the Department 
may require that prisoners pay an amount to the Board sufficient for the prisoner's board and personal expenses, both 
inside and outside the jail, facility, or residence, including costs of administering such prisoner's work furlough 
program, laundry service fee, and travel or van service fee. The Department currently sets these fees in Department 
standard operating procedure. (11-2-12) 
05. Hobby Craft Surcharge. Pursuant to Department standard operating procedure, the Department 
may charge offenders who participate in facility hobby craft activities a surcharge to offset the cost of hobby craft 
supplies and items that are used by participating offenders, such as hobby shop tools. The Department currently sets 
the fee in Department standard operating procedure. ( 11-2-12) 
06. Photo Copying Fee. Pursuant to Department standard operating procedure, the Department may 
charge offenders a fee for photocopying court documents relating to qualified legal claims or other documents as 
authorized by the Department. Offenders will not be denied access to courts based on their inability to pay for 
photocopies related to qualified legal claims. The Department currently sets the fee in Department standard operating 
procedure. (11-2-12) 
07. Medical Co-Pay Fee. Pursuant to Section 20-209, Idaho Code, the Board shall provide for the 
care, maintenance and employment of all prisoners now or hereinafter committed to its custody. In order to offset the 
costs associated therewith, the Department may charge offenders a fee for medical services. The IDOC and/or 
contract medical provider shall not deny an offender access to healthcare services based on the offender's inability to 
pay. The Department currently sets the fee in Department standard operating procedure. (11-2-12) 
014.-103. (RESERVED) 
104. 10BACCO FREE ENVIRONMENT. 
The Department and all of its property, facilities, and vehicles shall be maintained tobacco free. No person shall 
possess or use tobacco products on or in vehicles or properties owned, leased, rented and operated or managed by the 
Department. No offender, employee, contractor, volunteer, vendor, or intern shall possess or use tobacco products in 
or on any Department work site. (11-5-99) 
01. Applicability. Section 104 is applicable to all persons, regardless of status as public or non-public 
as defined in Subsection 010.40. (7-6-01) 
02. Exception. Tobacco products may be kept in a securely locked vehicle in a Department parking lot. 
(11-5-99) 
105. VICTIM NOTIFiCATIONS. 
Section 013 Pages 
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